Chadwick Gambit: Software Tools for Game Theory

Bibliography#

Articles on computation of Nash equilibria#

[BlaTur23]

Bland, J. R. and Turocy, T. L., 2023. Quantal response equilibrium as a structural model for estimation: The missing manual. SSRN working paper 4425515.

[Eav71]

B. C. Eaves, “The linear complementarity problem”, 612-634, Management Science , 17, 1971.

[GovWil03]

Govindan, Srihari and Robert Wilson. (2003) “A Global Newton Method to Compute Nash Equilibria.” Journal of Economic Theory 110(1): 65-86.

[GovWil04]

Govindan, Srihari and Robert Wilson. (2004) “Computing Nash Equilibria by Iterated Polymatrix Approximation.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 28: 1229-1241.

[Jiang11]

A. X. Jiang, K. Leyton-Brown, and N. Bhat. (2011) “Action-Graph Games.” Games and Economic Behavior 71(1): 141-173.

[KolMegSte94]

Daphne Koller, Nimrod Megiddo, and Bernhard von Stengel (1996). “Efficient computation of equilibria for extensive two-person games.” Games and Economic Behavior 14: 247-259.

[LemHow64]

C. E. Lemke and J. T. Howson, “Equilibrium points of bimatrix games”, 413-423, Journal of the Society of Industrial and Applied Mathematics , 12, 1964.

[Man64]

O. Mangasarian, “Equilibrium points in bimatrix games”, 778-780, Journal of the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 12, 1964.

[McK91]

Richard McKelvey, A Liapunov function for Nash equilibria, 1991, California Institute of Technology.

[McKMcL96]

Richard McKelvey and Andrew McLennan, “Computation of equilibria in finite games”, 87-142, Handbook of Computational Economics , Edited by H. Amman, D. Kendrick, J. Rust, Elsevier, 1996.

[PNS04]

Ryan Porter, Eugene Nudelman, and Yoav Shoham. “Simple search methods for finding a Nash equilibrium.” Games and Economic Behavior 664-669, 2004.

[Ros71]

J. Rosenmuller, “On a generalization of the Lemke-Howson Algorithm to noncooperative n-person games”, 73-79, SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 21, 1971.

[Sha74]

Lloyd Shapley, “A note on the Lemke-Howson algorithm”, 175-189, Mathematical Programming Study , 1, 1974.

[Tur05]

Theodore L. Turocy, “A dynamic homotopy interpretation of the logistic quantal response equilibrium correspondence”, 243-263, Games and Economic Behavior, 51, 2005.

[Tur10]

Theodore L. Turocy, “Using Quantal Response to Compute Nash and Sequential Equilibria.” Economic Theory 42(1): 255-269, 2010.

[VTH87]

G. van der Laan, A. J. J. Talman, and L. van Der Heyden, “Simplicial variable dimension algorithms for solving the nonlinear complementarity problem on a product of unit simplices using a general labelling”, 377-397, Mathematics of Operations Research , 1987.

[Wil71]

Robert Wilson, “Computing equilibria of n-person games”, 80-87, SIAM Applied Math, 21, 1971.

[Yam93]

Y. Yamamoto, 1993, “A Path-Following Procedure to Find a Proper Equilibrium of Finite Games “, International Journal of Game Theory .

General game theory articles and texts#

[Harsanyi1967a]

John Harsanyi, “Games of Incomplete Information Played By Bayesian Players I”, 159-182, Management Science , 14, 1967.

[Harsanyi1967b]

John Harsanyi, “Games of Incomplete Information Played By Bayesian Players II”, 320-334, Management Science , 14, 1967.

[Harsanyi1968]

John Harsanyi, “Games of Incomplete Information Played By Bayesian Players III”, 486-502, Management Science , 14, 1968.

[KreWil82]

David Kreps and Robert Wilson, “Sequential Equilibria”, 863-894, Econometrica , 50, 1982.

[McKPal95]

Richard McKelvey and Tom Palfrey, “Quantal response equilibria for normal form games”, 6-38, Games and Economic Behavior , 10, 1995.

[McKPal98]

Richard McKelvey and Tom Palfrey, “Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games”, 9-41, Experimental Economics , 1, 1998.

[Mye78]

Roger Myerson, “Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept”, 73-80, International Journal of Game Theory , 7, 1978.

[Nas50]

John Nash, “Equilibrium points in n-person games”, 48-49, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences , 36, 1950.

[Och95]

Jack Ochs, “Games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria: An experimental study”, Games and Economic Behavior 10: 202-217, 1995.

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Reinhard Selten, Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games , 25-55, International Journal of Game Theory , 4, 1975.

[vanD83]

Eric van Damme, 1983, Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria , Springer-Verlag, Berlin.

Textbooks and general reference#

[Mye91]

Roger Myerson, 1991, Game Theory : Analysis of Conflict , Harvard University Press.